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597 
NOTES 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE 
NEED FOR CLARITY IN THE ECPA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Private—Keep Out.” “Private and Confidential.” “Do Not Disturb.” 
Privacy pervades American society, and Americans cherish their privacy 
rights. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects . . ..”1 Numerous other privacy laws have followed the Constitution’s 
lead,2 and invasion of privacy has long been an established tort action.3 
Given the substantial legacy of privacy rights and the dramatic technological 
advances during the past few decades, it is no surprise that Congress enacted 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 19864 (“ECPA”) to extend 
privacy law into the electronic communications area. 
The ECPA is an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“1968 Act”),5 which protected wire and oral 
communications from privacy breaches. The ECPA expanded legal privacy 
protection to include electronic communications. The ECPA is divided into 
three titles, each addressing a slightly different area. Title I addresses the 
interception and disclosure of different types of communications.6 Title II 
deals with access to stored electronic communications.7 Title III regulates the 
use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, which are used to record the 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq. (1996) (outlining First 
Amendment privacy protection with limits on searches and seizures by government officers and 
employees in criminal investigations, and giving civil right of action to aggrieved persons); Buckley 
Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994) (protecting rights of students and parents to inspect 
educational records and prohibiting funds for educational institutions that release education records 
without written consent from the student or parents); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et 
seq. (1993) (insuring consumer reporting agencies respect consumers’ rights to privacy by limiting the 
information they can disclose and by requiring agencies to get permission from consumers before 
disclosure). 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 652 (1977). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 - 3127 (1994). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994). 
 7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 - 2707 (1994). 
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telephone numbers dialed from and into a specific telephone line.8 This Note 
addesses only Titles I and II.  Title III is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Title I prohibits the intentional interception of wire, oral or electronic 
communications, and the use or disclosure of such communications with the 
knowledge that they were obtained through unlawful interception.9 The term 
“intercept” is defined in Title I as the acquisition of the contents of any such 
communication through the use of a device.10 Title I is often called the 
Wiretap Act. Exceptions to the prohibitions in Title I include communication 
service providers who are acting in a capacity necessary to provide the 
service, or who are responding to a court order. Consent of one of the parties 
to the communication and the acquisition of foreign intelligence information 
by the United States Government are also exceptions.11 
Title II, the Stored Communications Act, is focused more narrowly, 
dealing exclusively with electronic communications. Title II forbids 
intentional, unauthorized access to and disclosure of stored electronic 
communications,12 and gives specific requirements for government access to 
stored electronic communications.13 An exception to the Title II prohibition 
of unlawful access to stored electronic communications exists for 
communication service providers.14 In addition, several exceptions to the 
prohibition of disclosure are enumerated. These include disclosure to an 
addressee or intended recipient, disclosure with the consent of one of the 
parties, and disclosure to a law enforcement agency if the contents were 
inadvertently obtained and appear to pertain to the commission of a crime.15 
While the ECPA represented significant progress for privacy generally 
when it was passed in 1986, technology has continued to outpace the law. 
The ECPA was required to update the 1968 Act in order to preserve privacy 
rights in light of advances in technology. Similarly, the ECPA has been made 
less relevant and less effective due to subsequent advances in technology 
 
 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 - 3127 (1994).  
 9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994); see also infra  note 47 for the text of this statute. 
 10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994); see also infra  note 61 for the ECPA’s definition of 
“intercept.” 
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1994); see also infra  note 25 for the text of the provision. 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702 (1994); see also infra  notes 49 and 82 for the relevant text of 
the statutes.  
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) states as follows: 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication 
service of the contents of an electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued 
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant . . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).  
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1994); see also infra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 15. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1994); see also infra  note 82 for the text of the statute. 
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which have occurred even more rapidly then between the passage of the 1968 
Act and the ECPA.16 Laws concerning privacy must be clear, easily 
applicable, and up-to-date so as to safeguard this valuable right. Because the 
ECPA has proven itself to be unclear and confusing, especially in light of 
advances in technology, it needs to be amended to promote privacy in an 
increasingly technological world. 
One major problem courts have faced with the ECPA is that it contains no 
guidelines for determining whether Title I or Title II applies in a given 
situation, though the two titles provide different standards and different 
punishments.17 Title I’s “interception” and Title II’s “access” may appear 
easily distinguishable at first glance,18 but in today’s technological realm 
things are seldom so clear. For example, when an individual reads an e-mail 
message intended for another who has not yet read it, but who has left the 
message open on a computer screen, has the individual intercepted the 
electronic communication or accessed it in electronic storage?19 If this 
preliminary determination cannot be made, judges must either choose 
randomly between the ECPA provisions or look elsewhere to determine 
liability. 
Another problem with the ECPA is its narrow prohibition on disclosure of 
stored electronic communications.20 While virtually all unauthorized access 
to electronic communications is unlawful,21 service providers are the only 
parties prohibited from actually disclosing the contents of stored 
communications.22 For example, the online service provider America Online 
cannot publish your e-mail stored within its system, but a person whom you 
have authorized to use your account could publish your private e-mail 
without violating the ECPA.23 Private, stored electronic communications 
 
 
 16. The most revolutionary technological change since the original ECPA was passed in 1986 is 
without doubt the advent of the Internet, a global, publicly accessible computer network. Subsequent 
mainstream acceptance and adoption of Internet technologies have had a profound influence on the 
United States economy, journalism, the government, and people’s everyday lives. For example, 
electronic mail (e-mail) has become a fundamental element of personal and business communications 
in this country, and e-mail clearly falls within the purview of the ECPA. The increasing popularity of 
e-commerce, consumer purchasing via credit cards on the World Wide Web (WWW), is a monumental 
privacy issue. For a more detailed explanation of the development of the Internet, see infra note 115. 
 17. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1994) with 18 U.S.C. § 2701 
(1994); see also infra  notes 47 and 49 for the text of the statutes.  
 18. See infra  notes 47 and 49 for the text of the relevant ECPA provisions.  
 19. This question is at the core of Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997). See 
infra  notes 88, 89, 91 and accompanying text for further explanation of this case. 
 20. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994); see also infra  note 82 for the text of the statute. 
 21. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994); see also infra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994); see also infra  note 82 for the text of the statute. 
 23. This person would not have violated Title I, because he or she did not intercept the e-mail 
while it was in transmission as “intercept” is defined in Title I. See infra notes 47 and 61 for the 
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deserve stronger protection from unwarranted disclosure. 
A third problem area in the complex ECPA is the lax standards for 
accessing stored communications that apply to electronic communication 
service providers.24 Specifically, service provider employees can freely 
rummage through subscribers’ communications, especially if they claim it is 
necessary to maintain the system.25 While legitimate business or system 
concerns may warrant service provider access upon occasion, the privacy of 
electronic communications need not be compromised. 
The lack of statutory guidelines as to whether Title I or Title II should 
apply, the law’s narrow protection for stored electronic communications, and 
the law’s leniency on service provider access to stored communications 
comprise the three areas of the ECPA most in need of change. Student26 and 
attorney commentators,27 as well as the courts,28 all point to the need for 
 
 
relevant Title I provision and the statutory definition of “intercept,” respectively. There is no Title II 
violation because the person had authorization to access the account. See infra note 49 for the relevant 
Title II provision. Also, the disclosure of the e-mail contents by the person is not prohibited by the 
ECPA, since he or she is not providing the electronic communication service to the public. See infra 
note 82 for another relevant Title II provision. 
 24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1994); see also infra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1994), quoted in infra  note 49; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2), which 
states: 
(2)(a)(I) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or on [sic] 
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose 
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, 
or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity 
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to 
the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or 
service quality control checks.  
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(I) (1994). 
 26. See Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Comment, Changing Technologies and the Expectation of 
Privacy: A Modern Dilemma, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189 (Fall 1996). Student commentator Michelle 
Skatoff-Gee agrees that better privacy protection for changing technology is needed. Specifically, she 
observes that new technologies make it hard to determine whether or not a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists. See id. at 202. Skatoff-Gee even goes so far as to say that Title I of the ECPA codifies 
Fourth Amendment principles, a fact that further supports the need for the privacy law to change with 
technology. See id . See also Robert S. Steere, Keeping “Private E-Mail” Private: A Proposal to 
Modify the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U.L. REV. 231 (Fall 1998) (proposing 
that Congress amend the statutory definitions of “elect ronic communication,” “wire communication,” 
“electronic storage,” and “electronic communication system” to relieve the confusion surrounding 
these terms in the ECPA). 
 27. See Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the 
Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & T ECH . L.J. 1, 2 (1998). Katrin 
Schatz Byford recently noted that there is a great need for uniformity in legal privacy theory and 
privacy law, especially in the electronic communications area. Byford opines that privacy legislation 
must go beyond the “piecemeal attempts that have traditionally been made to prevent specific privacy 
intrusions in narrowly delimited areas.” Id. at 57. Byford also observed that because the ECPA 
contains an exception for interceptions and disclosures for which the consent of at least one of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/10
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clarification in the ECPA. While much clarification is needed, the task is not 
insurmountable. A few simple additions to the text of the ECPA would 
remove much of the confusion that presently surrounds its interpretation.29 
This Note first examines the legislative history of the ECPA and 
interpretations of the ECPA by various courts in various jurisdictions. Next, 
this Note analyzes the legislative history and court decisions and discusses 
the strong points and shortcomings that emerge therefrom. Finally, this Note 
offers a solution to the convoluted ECPA in the form of several specific 
amendments. 
 
 
parties has been given, it is not a strong enough protection against informational privacy violations in 
contemporary networked environments. See id. at 58. 
 28. See, e.g. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1484 (10th Cir. 1997) (admitting confusion as to 
exactly how the ECPA applies to law enforcement officers); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United 
States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (commenting on the ECPA’s “lack of clarity”); 
United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D. Mass. 1997) (pointing out the lack of a definition 
for “access” in either Title I or II of the ECPA). 
 29. See infra  notes 146, 149, 151, 154, 159, and accompanying text for proposals to amend and 
clarify the language of the ECPA. In the years since the ECPA was enacted, several amendments to the 
ECPA have been proposed and passed as new technology has emerged. The Telephone Privacy Act of 
1990 was proposed to clarify the legal status of Caller ID services. See H.R. 4340, 101st Cong. (1990). 
The Motion Picture Anti-Piracy Act was proposed to amend the ECPA to prohibit devices whose 
primary purpose was to deactivate copy protection technology. See S. 1086, 102nd Cong. (1991). 
Neither of these proposed bills was passed.  
 The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 broadened government 
agency access to telephone subscriber information. See 47 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1998). The law 
amended § 2709 of the ECPA to ensure that advancing technology would not encroach on government 
surveillance. Specifically, the amendment requires an electronic communications service provider to 
give the Federal Bureau of Investigation access to identification information of subscribers without a 
court order or subpoena, when the information is allegedly related to a foreign counterintelligence 
investigat ion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (1994). 
 One of the more recently proposed amendments to the ECPA is the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998. See S. 2326, 105th Cong. (1998). This act would require the Federal Trade 
Commission to promulgate rules governing children’s World Wide Web sites. The rules would require 
commercial web sites to get parental consent before requesting personal information from children 
under the age of 12, and to ensure the confidentiality of any personal information gathered from 
children. This act is currently under consideration by the Senate Committee on Commerce.  
 In 1999, several bills to amend various sections of the ECPA were introduced. One bill would 
amend Title III of the ECPA to allow for the use of clone pagers by law enforcement officials. See S. 
411, 106th Cong. (1999). Another bill, known as the Telephone Privacy Act of 1999, would allow 
interception of telephone communications only after the consent of all parties. See S. 781, 106th Cong. 
(1999). The Patients’ Telephone Privacy Act of 1999 would require the consent of patients before 
health insurance companies or physicians could intercept the patients’ wire, oral, or electronic 
communications. See S. 782, 106th Cong. (1999). Finally, the Electronic Rights for the 21st Century 
Act would increase law enforcement access to information concerning the location of computers, and 
would enhance privacy protection for information on computer networks and on the Internet. See S. 
854, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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II. THE ECPA IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW 
A. Legislative History 
According to legislative history, the purpose of the ECPA was to update 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196830 to ensure 
continued privacy protection in the presence of new computer and 
telecommunications technologies.31 The legislature’s emphasis on privacy in 
the passage of the ECPA is evident by the inclusion within the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s Report of Justice Brandeis’ powerful dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States32. In this dissent, Brandeis vehemently defended 
privacy and opined that government wiretapping violates the Fourth 
Amendment.33 By enacting the ECPA, Congress attempted to strike a 
balance between privacy interests in personal and proprietary information on 
the one hand and legitimate law enforcement interests on the other.34 
In addition to privacy issues, Congress was concerned with updating the 
law to address the significant changes in communication technology that 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, including electronic mail, or e-mail.35 The 
Senate Committee that examined the ECPA wanted to preserve privacy for 
electronic communications that are subject to control by third party computer 
operators.36 Because the information in those communications has virtually 
no constitutional privacy protection,37 Congress expressly provided privacy 
 
 
 30. Congress stated that the purpose of the 1968 Act was to balance individual privacy interests 
and law enforcement investigative interests. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 87 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. The 1968 Act prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons 
other than law enforcement officers investigating certain types of crimes pursuant to a court order, 
with exceptions for several groups. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). Congress also said that the 1968 Act 
was a response to the Supreme Court decisions of Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to government interception of a telephone conversation), and Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to electronic 
eavesdropping upon oral conversations). See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 105-108 (1968), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 
 31. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
 32. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 33. See id. at 485. 
 34. This scheme is easily discerned in the structure of the statutes themselves. For example, in 
Title II, §§ 2701 and 2702 protect privacy concerns of citizens, whereas § 2703 describes the 
parameters for government and law enforcement access to electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701, 2702, 2703 (1994), quoted in infra  notes 49, 82 and supra  note 13, respectively. 
 35. The Senate Report which recommended passage of the ECPA cited electronic mail, 
computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular telephones, cordless telephones, paging devices, 
and video teleconferencing as some of the technological advances the ECPA was designed to reach. 
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
 36. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
 37. The Senate Committee cited United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, n.3 (1976) (concluding 
that a bank customer has no standing to contest disclosure of his or her bank records). 
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protection for those communications in the statutes of the ECPA.38 
Congress seemed particularly concerned that the law had not kept pace 
with technology in the communications area. Indeed, Senator Leahy of 
Vermont stated in his introduction of the bill that the existing law as set forth 
in the 1968 Act was “hopelessly out of date.”39 Some of the changes to the 
1968 Act that Congress enacted were relatively minor,40 while others were 
quite drastic.41 In essence, Congress hoped to update the law and accomplish 
vast improvements in electronic communication law with the ECPA. 
B. Case Law: Should ECPA Title I or Title II apply? 
Since the passage of the ECPA in 1986, several courts have considered 
the necessary choice of whether to apply either Title I or Title II, discussing 
the “interception” of transmitted communications in Title I as opposed to the 
“accessing” of stored communications in Title II.42 Steve Jackson Games, 
Inc. v. United States Secret Service43 is the most prevalently cited case that 
examines this issue. In Steve Jackson Games, the Secret Service seized a 
computer from the plaintiff’s premises in the course of an investigation.44 
The seized computer housed an electronic bulletin board system45 that 
 
 
 38. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; see also Title II 
of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1994). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
 40. For example, the ECPA changed the state of mind requirement from “willful” to 
“intentional.” See id. at 5. Also, Congress redefined “intercept” to make it clear that it is illegal to 
intercept the non-voice portion of a wire communication. See id. at 12. 
 41. The best examples of drastic changes are the Title II statutes on unlawful access to stored 
communications; they are original to the ECPA, and are modeled on the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. See id. at 3. Congress also responded to industry interest groups by 
implementing changes in satellite provisions and cellular phone provisions. See id. at 5. The definition 
of “contents” was amended to exclude information about the identity of parties or the existence of the 
communication. See id. at 12. Finally, Congress added a new government action for injunctive relief 
that is separate from the criminal penalties specified in the ECPA. See id. at 19. 
 42. See infra  notes 47 and 49 and accompanying text for the text of the ECPA statutes and for 
further details on the law.  
 43. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 44. See id. at 458. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. produces books, magazines and role-playing 
games. The company established a bulletin board system (BBS) in the mid-1980s to post information 
about its games, to encourage interest in the role-playing hobby, and to communicate with customers 
via e-mail. One of Steve Jackson Games’ employees, Loyd Blankenship, operated another BBS which 
provided access to a computerized text file containing confidential information about the Bell 
telephone system’s emergency calling system. The Secret Service’s search and seizure was aimed at 
recovering this confidential information, and because Blankenship was a co-systems operator of the 
Steve Jackson Games BBS, that equipment was seized as well. It was the latter seizure that resulted in 
this lawsuit. See id . 
 45. See id. Bulletin board systems (BBS) are computers typically run by individuals in their 
homes that allow dial-up access to users. A BBS is similar to an online service like America Online, 
but on a much smaller, often localized scale. A BBS allows users to send and receive e-mail amongst 
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allowed plaintiff’s customers to access private e-mail. At the time of seizure, 
the computer contained stored e-mail messages that intended recipients had 
not yet retrieved from the system.46 Thus, the issue before the Fifth Circuit 
was whether the actions of the Secret Service constituted an “intercept[ion]” 
under Title I of the ECPA.47 
The court held that there was no violation of Title I because the Secret 
Service agents did not seize the messages while they were being 
transmitted.48 However, the court held that the Secret Service violated Title II 
 
 
themselves, and sometimes with other BBS’s and their users. The posting of public messages in 
discussion groups or forums is also a typical service of a BBS, as are file downloads and online games. 
BBS’s were popular among personal computer users in the 1980s and early 1990s before general 
access to the Internet became common. Their popularity has not died out completely, as is evidenced 
by the facts in Steve Jackson Games and Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997). See infra 
notes 73-74 and accompanying text for an account of the use of a BBS by the parties in Davis. 
 46. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460. 
 47. See id. Title I’s section 2511 is entitled, “Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications prohibited.” It states: 
[A]ny person who -- 
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures another person to intercept or endeavor 
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;  
intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when -- 
such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like 
connection used in a wire communication . . . 
intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, 
or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was 
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this 
subsection;  
intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing . . . the information was obtained . . . in violation of this subsection . . .  
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection 
(5).  
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1994). 
 48. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461. There has been much criticism of this decision, 
particularly from privacy advocates. They argue that the court interpreted the language of the ECPA, 
especially the term, “intercept,” much too narrowly. See Tatsuya Akamine, Proposal For a Fair 
Statutory Interpretation: E-Mail Stored In a Service Provider Computer Is Subject to an Interception 
Under The Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 519 (1999) (interpreting the ECPA term “electronic 
communication” to include “electronic storage,” thereby contradicting the Fifth Circuit’s analysis by 
claiming that stored electronic communications can be intercepted within the meaning of Title I); A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, and The Constitution, 
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709, 897 (1995) (declaring the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the ECPA a 
“stunted view”); Nicole Giallonardo, Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service: The 
Government’s Unauthorized Seizure of Private E-Mail Warrants More Than the Fifth Circuit’s Slap 
on the Wrist, 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 179, 203-04 (1995) (concluding that the Fifth 
Circuit should have followed the plain meaning of “intercept,” which is broader than the statutory 
definition); Jarrod J. White, Commentary: E-Mail @ Work.Com: Employer Monitoring of Employee 
E-Mail, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 1079, 1083 (1997) (claiming that the Fifth Circuit’s narrow decision means 
that it is virtually impossible to intercept e-mail within the meaning of the ECPA). 
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because the seizure was unauthorized “access” that prevented authorized 
“access.”49 The court reasoned that because Congress used the word 
“transfer” in its definition of “electronic communication,” and because it 
omitted any reference to electronic storage in that definition,50 there was no 
intent for “intercept” to apply to electronic communications in storage.51 This 
definition of electronic communication is in contrast to the statutory 
definition of “wire communication,”52 which encompasses stored wire 
communications, and to which “intercept” clearly applies. 
The court also observed that Congress apparently did not intend to require 
that a Title II violation be linked to a Title I violation.53 This observation is 
supported by the fact that substantive and procedural requirements for the 
 
 
 49. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 458, 462 (5th Cir. 
1994). The relevant Title II provision, § 2701, is as follows: 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever -- 
intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided; or 
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; 
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication 
while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section . . . 
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to conduct authorized -- 
by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; 
by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user; or 
in section 2703, 2704 or 2518 of this title. 
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). 
 50. The ECPA definition states: 
“electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not 
include-- 
any wire or oral communication; 
any communication made through a tone-only paging device; 
any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or 
electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system 
used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.  
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994). 
 51. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; see also infra  note 61 for the statutory 
definition of “intercept.” 
 52. The definition of “wire communication” is “any aural transfer made in whole or in part 
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other 
like connection . . . and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(1) (1994). 
 53. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. The det ermination that Titles I and II of the ECPA 
are essentially mutually exclusive is a central theme in ECPA jurisprudence. Many courts continue to 
look to the reasoning by the Fifth Circuit in this case to make similar determinations. See generally 
Davis v. Gracey, 111 F. 3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997); Wesley v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997), 
United States v. Reyes,  922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). For details on each court’s reliance on 
Steve Jackson Games, see infra notes 76, 91, and 55 and accompanying text. 
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government to intercept are much more stringent than the requirements for 
government access to stored communications.54 Also, other requirements for 
government interception, such as minimization, duration, and types of crimes 
available for investigation do not exist with respect to government access to 
electronic  storage.55 The Fifth Circuit laid the groundwork for ECPA 
interpretation in Steve Jackson Games, particularly with respect to the 
mutually exclusive nature of Titles I and II. 
The Ninth Circuit has also recently faced the dilemma of whether to apply 
ECPA Title I, Title II, or both, but in the voicemail rather than e-mail 
context. In United States v. Smith,56 an employee accessed a co-worker’s 
voicemail box, then listened to and recorded one of the co-worker’s stored 
messages that implicated several employees in an insider trading deal.57 The 
court held that the act of obtaining and recording the voicemail message was 
an “intercept[ion]” and was governed by Title I of the ECPA, not Title II.58 
The message here was a “wire communication” because it was an “aural 
transfer” made using a wire (the telephone line), and was then in “electronic 
 
 
 54. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. The difference is essentially that government 
officials must only obtain a warrant to access stored electronic communications under Title II, but they 
must obtain a court order to intercept electronic communications under Title I. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2703(a), 2518. 
 55. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. Government access to electronic storage was at 
issue in United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), in conjunction with constitutional 
issues. Federal agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms seized three different pagers 
from the defendant. See id. Because the agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized the 
third pager using a warrant without probable cause, the court held that the seizure violated the ECPA. 
See id. at 837. In determining the ECPA violation, the court first examined whether the agents’ 
conduct violated Title I by intercepting electronic communications or whether it violated Title II by 
accessing stored communications. See id. at 836.  
 While struggling to define “interception” and “electronic storage,” the court cited statutory 
definitions and observed that electronic communications do not include those in electronic storage. See 
id. The court concluded that “intercept” means “acquiring the transfer of data,” and the requirement 
that the acquisition be simultaneous with the original transmission is implied. See id. Drawing on Steve 
Jackson Games, the court said that retrieving numbers from the memory of a pager is more like 
accessing electronic communications in storage than intercepting them. See id. at 836-37. Therefore, 
Title II applied in this case. 
 56. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 57. See id. at 1054. In this case, two fundamental government policies seem to clash. On the one 
hand, the government clearly has an interest in preventing and punishing insider trading deals, but on 
the other hand, the most compelling evidence in this case was obtained in such a way as to violate the 
ECPA. The Ninth Circuit avoided a contradiction in the law by holding that the district court correctly 
suppressed the tape of the voicemail message itself, but not the other government evidence, because 
the other evidence was not derived directly from the illegal recording. See id. at 1063. 
 58. See id. at 1059. The issue of whether Title I or Title II controls was of particular significance 
in this case, because the exclusion of evidence was at stake. Title I (Wiretap Act) excludes evidence of 
any intercepted communication, see 18 U.S.C. § 2515, whereas Title II (Stored Communications Act) 
does not allow exclusion of evidence as a remedy, see 18 U.S.C. § 2708.  
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storage” on the company voicemail system.59 
The Ninth Circuit strayed far from traditional ECPA analysis in an 
attempt to harmonize Titles I and II of the ECPA by claiming that “intercept” 
and “access” are not temporally different and that “access” is a lesser-
included offense of “intercept.”60 As support for its interpretation of the law, 
the court cited the statutory definition of “intercept,” which uses the term 
“acquisition,”61 and the fact that the ordinary meaning of “access” is adhered 
to in the ECPA.62 The court next pointed to the different penalty schemes for 
Titles I and II of the ECPA,63 and the absence of an exclusion of evidence 
remedy in Title II as support for its interpretation.64 Smith’s lesser-included 
offense interpretation is unique in ECPA jurisprudence. 
The view that Titles I and II of the ECPA are mutually exclusive is by far 
the prevailing sentiment, as evidenced recently in another voicemail decision. 
The defendant in United States v. Moriarty65 obtained and listened to 
voicemail messages intended for others.66 The court held that ECPA Title II 
§ 2701 governs once electronic messages are stored, so the defendant only 
faced allegations of violating Title II, not Title I as well.67 After a brief 
examination of the history of the ECPA and its interpretations, the court 
concluded that the amended definition of “intercept” in § 2510(4) requires 
contemporaneous acquisition of the communication, but “access” could 
apply to both contemporaneous and stored communications.68 
The court also noted that legislative intent indicates a temporal difference 
between § 2511 and § 2701; only Title II § 2701 applies once electronic 
 
 
 59. See Smith , 155 F.3d at 1055. The ECPA defines “electronic storage” as “any temporary, 
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission 
thereof; and any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes 
of backup protection of such communication.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(1994). 
 60. See Smith , 155 F.3d at 1058. 
 61. The ECPA definition is as follows: “‘intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the 
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, 
or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994). 
 62. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 63. Title I has harsher penalties than Title II. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(b), 2707, 2511, 2520 (1994). 
 64. See Smith , 155 F.3d at 1059. 
 65. 962 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 66. See id. at 219. 
 67. See id. at 221. This case was decided by a United States Magistrate Judge upon a motion by 
the defendant to dismiss Count II of the indictment and consolidate it with Count III. Count II alleged 
illegal wiretapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), and Count III alleged illegal access to voice 
mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701. The Magistrate judge granted the defendant’s motion. See id. at 
217-18. 
 68. See id. at 220. See also  infra  notes 149-151 and accompanying text for a proposed statutory 
definition of “access.”  
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messages are stored.69 In the context of this case, the court asserted that both 
accessing a voicemail system without listening to messages and actually 
listening to stored messages are aspects of “access” instead of “intercept” and 
are therefore subject to § 2701.70 To solidify its position, the court noted that 
listening to a stored voicemail message is not an “intercept[ion]” because it 
does not occur while the message is in transmission.71 The court concluded 
that the government was incorrect to charge the defendant under Title I 
§ 2511 for listening to the stored messages.72 This reasoning squarely follows 
the Fifth Circuit’s lead in Steve Jackson Games. 
The uncertainty surrounding interpretation of the ECPA has caused the 
Tenth Circuit to question when and if the law applies at all. In Davis v. 
Gracey,73 police officers seized computer equipment that was used to run a 
bulletin board system from which pornographic material was accessible.74 
The court held that the officers’ reliance on a valid warrant established a 
good faith defense to the ECPA.75 
The court distinguished this case from Steve Jackson Games by pointing 
to the fact that agents reviewed the contents of the stored electronic 
communications in Steve Jackson Games, but here the officers did not 
attempt to read the stored e-mail.76 In addition, whereas the owner of the 
bulletin board was not a suspect in Steve Jackson Games,77 the computer 
equipment seized here was an instrumentality of a crime for which the owner 
of the bulletin board was under investigation.78 
The court here noted some discrepancies in the ECPA, first pointing out 
that it is unclear whether Title II § 2701 applies to the law enforcement 
activities involved in this case, or if it is directed more toward “hackers.”79 
 
 
 69. See id . at 221; see also  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3, 32 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3555 (discussing the new statutes of Title II, which cover stored electronic communications, and 
identifying their model, the Right to Financial Privacy Act). 
 70. See United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 74. See id. at 1475; see also supra  note 45 for more information on bulletin board systems. After 
Davis’s state court criminal conviction for distributing obscene materials and his civil forfeiture of the 
computer equipment involved, he, along with his businesses and several users, brought this action 
under the ECPA against the officers who executed the search. See Davis, 111 F.3d at 1475. 
 75. See id. at 1485. The good faith defense in Title II of the statute is as follows: “A good faith 
reliance on (1) a court warrant or order . . . is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action 
brought under this chapter or any other law.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e)(1)(1994). 
 76. See Davis, 111 F.3d at 1483. 
 77. See supra  note 44 for details on the facts of Steve Jackson Games. 
 78. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1483 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Davis was under 
investigation for distributing obscene material. See id . at 1475. 
 79. See id . at 1484. The court cited State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, 
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The court also commented on the confusion surrounding the term “access” in 
the law.80 In spite of the considerable confusion surrounding the ECPA, the 
court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant police officers because 
of their reliance on the warrant.81 
C. Case Law: Narrow Prohibition of Disclosure of Stored Electronic 
Communications in ECPA § 2702 
Section 2702 of Title II of the ECPA governs the disclosure of contents of 
stored electronic communications,82 and its application has produced results 
 
 
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (commenting that “it appears that the ECPA was 
primarily designed to provide a cause of action against computer hackers, (i.e., electronic 
trespassers).”); see also infra  note 99 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. Both courts 
are likely uncertain about the application of the ECPA to law enforcement officers because of the 
inclusion of § 2703 and § 2704 in the ECPA. These sections outline the requirements for governmental 
access to electronic communications and for governmentally requested backup preservation of 
electronic communications. See also supra  note 13 for the text of the ECPA provision on government 
disclosure of stored communications.  
 80. See Davis, 111 F.3d at 1484. The court here was unsure if “access” encompassed the physical 
dismantling of the computer hardware. Pursuant to a search warrant, the officers had seized Davis’s 
bulletin board equipment, including computers, monitors, keyboards, modems, CD-ROM drives and 
changers. See id . at 1476. 
 81. See id . at 1484-85. 
 82. Title II’s § 2702 states: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) -- 
a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly 
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that 
service; and 
a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to 
any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that 
service-- 
on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from . . . a subscriber or customer 
of such service; and 
solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or 
customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications . . . 
A person or entity may divulge the contents of a communication-- 
to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent [thereof]; 
as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of this title; 
with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service; 
to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to 
its destination; 
as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service; or  
to a law enforcement agency, if such contents-- 
were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and 
appear to pertain to the commission of a crime. 
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potentially damaging to electronic privacy in courts around the country. The 
defendant in Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP83 gave the plaintiff access to 
its e-mail system because the plaintiff was a hired contractor. After a dispute 
arose between the parties, the defendant released sensitive contents of 
plaintiff’s e-mail messages to the Wall Street Journal, which published 
them.84 The district court held that the defendant was not liable under the 
ECPA because the defendant did not provide electronic communication 
service to the public.85 
While “public” is not defined by the statute or by case law, the ordinary 
meaning of the word must be assumed. Therefore, the court concluded that § 
2702 encompasses any entity that provides electronic communication service 
to the community at large.86 The defendant here had an e-mail system for 
internal communication for business purposes only.87 Andersen Consulting 
stands for the narrow concept that in order to be held liable for disclosing 
stored electronic communications under Title II of the ECPA, the disclosing 
party must be a public electronic communications service provider. 
Recipients of contents of stored electronic communications can disclose 
or use the contents without liability under the ECPA, as long as they are not 
electronic communication service providers. In Wesley College v. Pitts,88 a 
former clerical employee at a college inadvertently viewed the college 
president’s e-mail messages and revealed some of them to a current faculty 
member and a former faculty member, who then further disclosed the 
messages in a lawsuit.89 As a result, the college sued the former employees 
and the faculty member for violating Titles I and II of the ECPA.90 
 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994). 
 83. 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 84. See id. at 1042. In an article published on June 19, 1997, the Wall Street Journal quoted 
excerpts from some of Andersen Consulting’s e-mail messages sent during its work at UOP. Elizabeth 
MacDonald, E-Mail Trail Could Haunt Consultant in Court, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1997, at B1. For 
example, the article quotes an e-mail message written by an Andersen consultant concerning the 
qualifications of one of his fellow consultants: “He should be taking classes at a community college, 
not charging for this.” Id. It was partly this Wall Street Journal publication, along with the disclosure 
of the messages, that prompted Andersen Consulting to counterclaim against UOP. See Andersen 
Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1042. 
 85. See id  at 1043. According to 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), to be liable for disclosure of electronic 
communications in storage, the defendant must provide “electronic communication service to the 
public.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (1994); see also supra  note 82 for the text of the statute. 
 86. See Andersen Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1042. 
 87. See Andersen Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043. 
 88. 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997). 
 89. See id. at 378. The former faculty member was involved in a breach of contract suit against 
the college, and information concerning the president’s e-mail messages was initially discovered in a 
deposition for the contract case. See id. 
 90. This case is unusual in that the employer is suing the employees for violation of the ECPA. 
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The court held that the faculty members did not violate Title II by 
disclosing the contents of the e-mail because the faculty members were not 
communication service providers.91 The court also concluded that none of the 
defendants were liable for violating Title I of the ECPA; the former 
employee’s glimpse of the computer screen did not constitute an 
“interception” within the meaning of the ECPA, though the act may have 
constituted unauthorized access.92 
The court reasoned that Title I of the ECPA, § 2511(1)(a),93 requires an 
affirmative attempt to intercept or persuade another to intercept an electronic 
communication.94 Upon examining the computer expertise of the defendants 
and the times that the e-mail messages were sent, the court concluded that 
none of the defendants were liable for violating Title I of the ECPA, which 
concerns interception.95 “Intercept” within the meaning of the ECPA does 
not apply to electronic communications in “electronic storage,”96 and the e-
 
 
In many cases, employees sue their employers under the ECPA for monitoring e-mail and other 
communications sent over the employer’s system. See infra  note 104 and accompanying text for an 
example of a case illustrating that situation. In the cases where employees sue employers under the 
ECPA, courts around the country have repeatedly held that employees do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications sent on their employer’s electronic communications 
systems. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that employee fired for 
negative comments in company e-mail messages had no expectation of privacy in his e-mail); Bourke 
v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. YC-003979, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. June 1993) (holding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy for employees who were terminated for inappropriate excessive personal e-mail 
messages at work). 
 91. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997); see also supra note 82 for 
the text of the relevant ECPA statute. 
 92. See Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 384; see also supra  note 61 for the statutory definition of 
“intercept.” The court commented, “Congress had in mind more surreptitious threats to privacy than 
simply looking over one’s shoulder at a computer screen when it passed the ECPA.” Wesley College, 
974 F. Supp. at 384, 390. 
 93. The Title I prohibition on interception and disclosure begins as follows: “Except as otherwise 
specifically provided in this chapter any person who - (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication . . ..” 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994). 
 94. See Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 381. Title I, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) & (d), also prohibits 
disclosure of and use of the contents of any electronic communication while having reason to know the 
information was obtained through an illegal interception. See supra  note 47 for the text of the statute. 
 95. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 384, 390 (D. Del. 1997). The defendants’ 
computer expertise and the times that the e-mails were sent were very important here because they 
tended to show that the defendants did not intercept any message that was in transit, which is required 
for liability under the statute. See id . at 385. 
 96. See id. at 387. The statutory definition of “electronic communication” does not include 
electronic storage of the communications. See id. at 385; see also supra  note 50 for the statutory 
definition. A majority of courts that have looked at this area of the ECPA agree that there is no 
interception within Title I unless the acquisition of the communications is contemporaneous with their 
transmissions. See Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 385. The substantial differences between Titles I 
and II of the ECPA indicate that it was Congress’s intent that “intercept” not apply to electronically 
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mail messages at issue in this case were in electronic storage at the time of 
retrieval and disclosure by the defendants.97 Finally, the court agreed with the 
college’s complaint about the gap in ECPA coverage. If “intercept” does not 
include the viewing of stored electronic communications, then a person who 
does not provide an electronic communication service to the public (e.g. the 
defendants here) can freely disclose or use the contents of a communication 
that was unlawfully obtained from storage by a third party.98 Although 
disconcerting, this interpretation appears to accurately reflect the current 
language of the ECPA. 
In addition to its gap in coverage, the ECPA may cause damage to 
businesses and offer no recourse when the offender is not an electronic 
communication service provider. The defendant in State Wide Photocopy, 
Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.99 gave confidential customer 
information to plaintiff’s competitor after receiving the information through 
electronic communications.100 The district court held that the defendant was 
not liable for a disclosure violation of Title II of the ECPA because Tokai 
was a private financing business, not a public electronic communications 
service provider, and because the plaintiff was not clearly an aggrieved party 
within the meaning of the ECPA.101 The court here was not persuaded that 
§ 2702 was intended to protect against the “mundane conduct alleged in 
almost any wire fraud case—namely use of the wires . . . to perpetrate a 
scheme to defraud.”102 The current ECPA offers no assistance to those in 
State Wide’s position. 
 
 
stored communications. See id. at 387. 
 97. See id. at 378. The messages were in storage in the president’s e-mail account. 
 98. See id. at 389; for an example of how this gap in the ECPA works, see supra  note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. 909 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 100. See id. at 139. Defendant Tokai was a financing business that State Wide used to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of applicants who were in the process of buying or leasing office equipment from 
State Wide. Tokai agreed that its only use of the information faxed from State Wide would be to 
evaluate financing for the customers. However, State Wide discovered Tokai was supplying the 
confidential information to Atlantic, one of State Wide’s competitors, who would then offer the 
customer a lower price. See id . 
 101. See id. at 145-46. The plaintiff did not allege that it was a provider, subscriber, or customer 
within the meaning of § 2707, the section outlining civil actions under the ECPA. Further, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2707(a) states:  
(a)[A]ny provider of electronic communication service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by 
any violation of this chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a 
knowing or intentional state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity 
which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. 
18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (1994). 
 102. See State Wide, 909 F. Supp. at 146. 
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D. Case Law: Liability Exception for Service Providers in ECPA § 2701 
The ECPA includes several provisions concerning electronic 
communications service providers, but the Title II liability exception in 
§ 2701(c)(1)103 is among the more controversial. This section contains a 
blanket exception to the prohibition of unauthorized access to stored 
electronic communications for service providers. The court addressed this 
section of the statute in Bohach v. City of Reno,104 where the Reno police 
department retrieved stored pager messages from officers involved in an 
internal affairs investigation.105 The court concluded that there was no 
“interception” in violation of Title I of the ECPA,106 and because the city was 
the system provider, it was free to retrieve the stored messages under Title II 
of the ECPA.107 
While analyzing the ECPA, the court first distinguished between 
interception and electronic storage in Titles I and II, respectively.108 Next the 
court concluded that there was no interception by the police department, 
because there was no direct interference with the transmission, such as 
tapping computer or phone lines, recording with hidden microphones, or 
cloning duplicate pagers to receive the same messages as the intended 
recipient.109 In dictum, the court noted that even if there was an 
“interception,” it was likely that consent was implied110 because the sender of 
 
 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (c) gives exceptions to the unlawful access of stored communications 
provisions in subsection (a). See supra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 104. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 105. See id. at 1233. The pagers involved were alphanumeric pagers, which allow users to send 
brief alphanumeric or voice messages. The Reno Police Department installed software on its local area 
network computers from which users could send messages. The messages sent on the system were first 
stored in files on a server at the police department, then transferred to a commercial paging company, 
who then sent them to the recipient via radio broadcast. See id . at 1234. 
 106. See id . at 1237. But see Anne L. Lehman, Comment, E-Mail in the Workplace: Question of 
Privacy, Property or Principle?, 5 CommLaw Conspectus 99, 109 (1997) (claiming that the court’s 
reliance on a common understanding of “intercept” is contrary to legislation that adapts to advancing 
technology). 
 107. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1237. 
 108. See id. at 1235-36. The court reasoned that “[a]n electronic communication may be put into 
electronic storage, but the storage is not itself a part of the communication.” Id. at 1235. Therefore, the 
“interception” of an electronic communication (governed by Title I of ECPA) is distinguished from 
access to such communication after it has been put into electronic storage (governed by Title II). See 
id. at 1235-36; see also  Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy 
and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 247-48 (1994) (distinguishing between the 
transmission phase and the storage phase of both e-mail and voice mail messages, and concluding that 
§ 2511 of the ECPA controls the transmission phase, while § 2701 controls the storage phase). 
 109. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236. 
 110. Under Title I’s consent provision, it is not unlawful for “a person acting under color of law to 
intercept a[n] . . . electronic communication, where . . . one of the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1994). 
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a message through a computer must necessarily understand and not object to 
the fact that the message will pass through that computer.111 
The court went on to examine Title II of the ECPA, since the access of 
stored communications was obviously the source of the plaintiff’s complaint. 
The Title II issue was quickly resolved, however, because the city was the 
electronic communication service provider, and § 2701(c)(1) lets service 
providers “do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications in 
electronic storage.”112 Therefore, the court ordered that the city of Reno was 
free to proceed with its internal affairs investigation.113 
III. ANALYSIS 
Since the passage of the ECPA in 1986, courts have had difficulty 
applying its provisions. The original intent of Congress in passing the law 
has been frustrated as technology has continued to advance. Ironically, 
Senator Leahy’s 1986 statement that the then current law was “hopelessly out 
of date”114 is equally applicable to the ECPA today, in light of the 
extraordinary technological developments that have occurred in the la st 
fourteen years.115 The ECPA is particularly ineffective in articulating the 
 
 
 111. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D. Nev. 1996). On a similar note, the 
court in United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996), held that the defendant had a 
reasonable, though limited, expectation of privacy in e-mail messages on a commercial subscription 
service. The defendant’s e-mail messages in storage with America Online were obtained pursuant to a 
warrant in an investigation of child pornography and obscenity. See id. at 412-14. The court stated that 
a network user has a reasonable expectation that e-mail will not be revealed to police, but there is 
always the risk that an employee of the service provider will obtain access; there is also a risk that the 
recipient of the e-mail will redistribute it. See id. at 418. 
 The Maxwell court analogized the relationship between a computer network subscriber and a 
network as similar to that of a bank customer and a bank, stating that neither the network subscriber 
nor the bank customer has a reasonable expectation that the records are completely private. See id. 
Also, in each situation, the customer has no control over which employees see their records. See id. 
While the court agreed with the government that privacy in e-mail messages varies with respect to the 
type of e-mail involved and the intended recipients, it nevertheless retained its holding that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail sent from one individual to another individual. See id. at 
418-19. This case makes it evident that a clear statutory statement on the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in electronic communications is needed.  
 112. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236; see also supra  note 49 for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1). 
 113. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1237. This decision is actually best known for its holding 
regarding privacy in employee e-mail. The court held the police officers had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the messages sent over the police department’s pager system. See id. at 1236; see also 
supra  note 90 for further discussion of e-mail privacy.  
 114. See supra  note 39 and accompanying text for an account of the Senator’s remark. 
 115. The most powerful example is the development and increasing popularity of the Internet. In 
1969, academic researchers and developers established the “ARPAnet,” a national computer network. 
By the time the ECPA was passed in 1986, ARPAnet had grown into a global Internet, but still only a 
relatively small number of academics and scientists had access to the network. The late 1980s saw 
both academic and corporate connectivity to the Internet gain in popularity, and by the mid-1990s, 
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appropriate application of Title I as opposed to Title II and in dealing with 
electronic communications service providers. 
Much confusion has surrounded the application of ECPA Title I versus 
Title II. Indeed, “the intersection of the Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520) and the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710) is a 
complex, often convoluted, area of the law.”116 The initial attempt to 
decipher this aspect of the ECPA by the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson 
Games117 remains the most plausible approach under the current wording of 
the statute. The Fifth Circuit astutely concluded that Congress did not intend 
for a violation of Title II to include a violation of Title I as well; the titles 
operate independently of one another.118 A communication is either 
intercepted while in transmission, thereby falling under Title I, or it is 
accessed while in storage, thereby falling under Title II. While the Fifth 
Circuit’s analysis makes this interpretation seem simple, it is far from 
obvious from the text of the ECPA. Uncertainty and conjecture are hallmarks 
of court decisions regarding Titles I and II of the ECPA, an act that is 
“famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity.”119 
One reason the statutes of the ECPA are unclear as to the application of 
Title I or Title II lies in the omission of a definition for the important term 
“access.” Because of this critical omission, courts have struck out on their 
own in search of the proper meaning for the term. For example, the court in 
United States v. Smith incorrectly concluded that “access” was a lesser-
included offense of “intercept.”120 However, it is possible to intercept 
communications without accessing them within the meaning of the statute, 
thereby negating the court’s logic.121 The Tenth Circuit in Davis v. Gracey 
 
 
personal computers all over the world were connecting to the Internet. For a more general discussion 
of the advances technology has made since the ECPA was passed, see supra  note 16. 
 116. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 117. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 118. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463; see also supra  note 53 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of the court’s reasoning.  
 119. Id. at 462. 
 120. See Smith , 155 F.3d at 1058. The court may have reached this conclusion partly because the 
questionable activity involved the interception of wire communications, not electronic 
communications. The court attempted to distinguish between the two to support its broader 
interpretation of “intercept,” see id. at 1057-58, but the narrower interpretation is preferable to ensure 
uniformity of results.  
 121. For example, a process colloquially referred to as “packet sniffing” allows a user to intercept 
raw computer network traffic without necessarily viewing the contents of those communications. The 
data sent within computer networks are often broken into subparts called “packets.” These packets are 
sent across network connections with identification codes as to which computer should receive the 
information. The packets are routed to the destination computer, then processed by that computer to 
make a complete communication, which, for example, might include an e-mail message. However, the 
other computers in the “network segment,” or local portion of the network, also have access to these 
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was not sure whether the term “access” applied to the physical dismantling of 
computer hardware or to the activities of law enforcement officers.122 In 
United States v. Moriarty , the court interpreted “access” as applying to both 
contemporaneous transmissions and stored communications.123 This broad 
interpretation of “access” is slightly flawed in that Congress apparently 
intended “access” to apply only to stored transmissions in the language of the 
ECPA.124 
The courts’ quest for the meaning of critical ECPA terms does not stop 
there. The Smith court misunderstood the meaning of “intercept” to be 
“actually acquiring the contents of a communication,”125 rather than simply 
gathering the signals of a communication simultaneously with 
transmission.126 “Access” was defined by the court as “being in position to 
acquire the contents of a communication,”127 but Congress seemed to intend 
that access encompass actual acquisition.128 Though the interpretive tools all 
point to this definition of access, the statute is nevertheless unclear because 
of Congress’s failure to include “access” in its definition section of the 
ECPA.129 When an integral ECPA term like “access” remains undefined by 
 
 
packets. In normal operation, these computers simply disregard packets on the network that are not 
intended for them. Packet sniffing involves setting up a computer to receive and store all packets on 
the network segment, regardless of their intended recipient. This interception does not, however, block 
the recipient’s access to the communications. In other words, a packet sniffer can, without the 
recipient’s knowledge, intercept that recipient’s electronic communications. The party using the packet 
sniffer may either actively look at the data or simply store it on his computer for later use. Thus, it is 
possible to “intercept” electronic communications without “accessing” them within the meaning of the 
ECPA. For an example of the mechanics of packet sniffing, see ÆLEEN FRISCH, ESSENTIAL SYSTEM 
ADMINISTRATION 595-97 (2d ed. 1995). 
 122. 111 F.3d 1472, 1484, n.13 (10th Cir. 1997). Considering Congress’s emphasis on law 
enforcement interests in passing the ECPA, the discrepancies made apparent in Davis should be 
clarified as soon as possible to remove any hindrance to effective law enforcement. See S. REP. NO. 
99-541, supra  note 31, at 4. (commenting that “[t]he lack of clear standards may expose law 
enforcement officers to liability and may endanger the admissibility of evidence.”) 
 123. 962 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D. Mass. 1997).  
 124. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701 (1994). Congress was careful not to mention the word “access” 
in Title I, which deals with interception of electronic communications. In addition, Congress did not 
mention “intercept” in Title II, which deals with access to stored electronic communications. There is 
an obvious intention to keep the two terms separate in the statutes.  
 125. Smith , 155 F.3d at 1058; but see United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (reasoning that Congress intended “intercept” to apply only to acquisition of data simultaneous 
with transmission of data, not to communications in electronic storage). 
 126. For courts who follow the latter definition, see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States 
Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
 127. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 128. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463 (explaining that when law enforcement officers 
intercept communications, they will often have to gain access to the contents of the communications to 
carry out their investigation)(emphasis added).  
 129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994). 
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Congress, courts can be expected to adopt a wide range of interpretations,130 
thereby endangering uniformity of the law. 
Beyond the Title I versus Title II debate and the confusion over “access,” 
the statutes of the ECPA pose even more serious threats to the privacy of 
electronic communications. Specifically, Title II of the ECPA does not 
prohibit individuals other than public electronic communication service 
providers from disclosing stored electronic communications.131 While courts 
have had little difficulty applying this statute, it often produces anomalous 
results. 
The most recent example of this Title II provision in action is Andersen 
Consulting LLP v. UOP,132 where the defendant disclosed to the Wall Street 
Journal plaintiff’s e-mail messages, which were sent on the defendant’s 
computer system.133 In Wesley College v. Pitts,134 the defendants did not 
provide an electronic communication service to the public, and so were free 
to disclose and use the contents of a communication that was unlawfully 
obtained from storage by a third party.135 The defendant in State Wide 
Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.136 disclosed the plaintiff’s 
electronic communications to a competitor of the plaintiff, but was not held 
liable because of the “public” provider prohibition in Title II of the ECPA.137 
The defendants in these cases escaped unpunished, despite the detrimental 
effect on plaintiffs’ reputations, because of the narrow Title II prohibition of 
the disclosure of stored electronic communications.138 These cases illustrate 
the harsh consequences of invasions of electronic privacy where no statutory 
protection exists. When drafted by Congress in 1986,139 the narrow scope of 
the ECPA was adequate to protect electronic privacy in the much smaller 
 
 
 130. For examples of various court interpretations, see supra  notes 120, 122, and 123 and 
accompanying text.  
 131. See supra note 82 for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). In addition, subsection (2) states, “a 
person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any 
person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service . . ..” 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (1994).  
 132. 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 133. See id. at 1042. 
 134. 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997). 
 135. See id. at 389. 
 136. 909 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 137. See supra  notes 99 and 101 for a discussion of the State Wide case. 
 138. See Andersen Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043; Wesley College, 974 F. Supp. at 389. 
 139. The comments in the Senate Committee Report of 1986 reveal that Congress considered the 
situation where a wire or electronic communications service provider also provides other services to 
the public. They stated that in such instances, the provider should be treated as if the communication 
services and the other services were provided by separate sources. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, supra note 
31, at 34. However, Congress did not seem to consider private entities that provide electronic 
communication services to their employees and contractors, but not to the outside public. 
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electronic communications market at the time. In contrast, the increased use 
of high technology and the pervasive use of electronic communication such 
as e-mail in today’s business world makes the ECPA positively harmful to 
current electronic privacy rights. 
Although not quite as serious as its narrow prohibition of disclosure, Title 
II of the ECPA threatens electronic privacy in another way through lax 
regulation of service providers. The ECPA liability exception for electronic 
communication service providers in Title II’s § 2701(c)(1)140 is confusing 
and has been misconstrued by courts.141 In Bohach v. City of Reno,142 the 
court rashly interpreted § 2701(c)(1) as allowing providers to do as they 
pleased in accessing their employees’ stored electronic communications.143 
While Congress clearly intended that service providers be allowed to access 
stored communications in order to conduct their business, it is not clear that 
Congress intended them to have free reign with their customers’ stored 
communications.144 Congress must answer the call of the courts to settle the 
intended meaning of the service provider liability exception in § 2701(c)(1). 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Because of the difficulty courts have with interpreting the ECPA as it is 
written, Congress should make a few simple changes to clarify the law in this 
 
 
 140. See supra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 141. In contrast, § 2703(c)(1)(A) is clear and relatively easy to apply . In this subsection, the 
ECPA specifically allows electronic communication service providers to reveal the identities of their 
subscribers. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) states:  
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a provider of electronic communication service or remote 
computing service may disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a) 
or (b) of this section) to any person other than a governmental entity. 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (1994). 
 The plaintiff in Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1106-7 (E.D. Mich. 
1998), posted a message that was harassing to her lover’s ex-wife, and she sued America Online under 
the ECPA after the company released her identity to the ex-wife pursuant to a subpoena. The district 
court held that the prohibitions of the ECPA do not apply in this situation. See id. at 1108.  
 The court reasoned that the ECPA prohibits disclosure of the contents of an electronic 
communication to any person, see 18 U.S.C. § 2702, or to the government, see 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 
without meeting certain restrictions. However, contents were not at issue. The issue, revealing the 
identity of an America Online customer, is specifically allowed by the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
(c)(1)(A) (1994). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim for violation of the ECPA failed. See Jessup-Morgan, 
20 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. 
 142. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 143. See id. at 1236. 
 144. This is evident from Congress’ statement in the Senate Committee Report regarding their 
goal of ensuring Fourth Amendment privacy protection to Americans in the wake of advanced 
technology. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, supra  note 31, at 4. 
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important area.145 For example, the application of Title I as opposed to Title 
II should be explained in detail. To achieve this goal, Congress could add a 
simple provision in one or both titles stating that 
Title I applies only to interception; that is, acquisition of 
communications that is contemporaneous with their transmission, and 
Title II applies when the communications at issue were in electronic 
storage at the time of the incident in question. A given electronic 
communication must fall under either Title I or Title II, but not both 
simultaneously.146 
This amendment would clarify the scope of each title of the ECPA, 
thereby circumventing much discussion and debate by the courts.147 It would 
also assist the electronic communications industry from a planning 
perspective, because consequences for violations of the ECPA would be 
more certain. 
Clarification of the scope of Titles I and II also demands a statutory 
definition of the term “access.” Several appellate courts as well as district 
courts have noted this omission from the ECPA,148 and were therefore forced 
to use contextual hints and legislative history to determine Congress’s 
intended meaning. To remedy the current confusion, “access” should be 
defined as “acquisition of or entry to.”149 Congress should also consider the 
inclusion of a statement explaining that “access” is completely separate from 
“interception”150 and it only applies to stored communications within the 
 
 
 145. At present, the simple changes proposed here would eliminate much of the confusion 
surrounding the ECPA as it is written. However, because of the nature of technology, and 
consequently the law that deals with technology, future changes will also need to be implemented. 
Indeed, the framework of the original ECPA will likely have to be abandoned at some point in the 
future to contend with as yet unfathomable advances in technology. The underlying goal of the ECPA 
- protecting electronic privacy and Fourth Amendment rights - should remain at the heart of any new 
legislation.  
 The author notes that since the drafting of this Note, a bill has been introduced in the House of 
Representatives called the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000.” See H.R. 5018, 106th 
Cong. (2000). While the bill attempts to expand the current law by adding “electronic 
communications” to the coverage of many provisions, it does not address the specific changes 
proposed here, and Congress should consider further changes to the law.  
 146. Congress could insert this proposed amendment in 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Title I), the 
interception provision, and in 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (Title II), the stored communications provision. 
Another option would be to add a section describing the scope of each title to 18 U.S.C. § 2510, the 
definitions provision. 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998); Steve Jackson Games, 
Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 148. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, n.13, (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Moriarty, 
962 F. Supp. 217, 219 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 149. Congress could add this definition to the definition section of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
 150. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4), 2511 (1994); see also supra  notes 61 and 47 for the text of the 
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ECPA.151 By establishing a definition for “access,” Congress can better 
express its original intent in passing the ECPA. Courts will no longer 
struggle with defining this term, and they will be able to forge on to 
interpretation and application.152 The differences in Titles I and II and their 
respective punishments will be made even clearer by defining the term 
“access.” 
Title II’s lack of prohibition for the disclosure of stored electronic 
communications by individuals other than electronic communications service 
providers153 also deserves Congress’s attention. Section 2702 of the ECPA 
should be extended to prohibit disclosure of unlawfully obtained stored 
electronic communications by anyone, not just service providers. Congress 
could accomplish this by adding a third subsection to § 2702(a) which could 
read, “A person or entity shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity 
the contents of any communication in electronic storage that was obtained 
through unlawful access as described in section 2701.”154 
By broadening the scope of the prohibition on disclosure of stored 
electronic communications, Congress can deter the further breach of privacy 
that occurs with disclosure of unlawfully obtained communications, which is 
unpunished under the current law.155 This amendment will better serve 
Congress’s purpose of strengthening electronic privacy rights by preventing 
the wily use of stored communications by non-providers like UOP.156 As 
technology and its accessibility within the business and private realms have 
advanced, opportunities to take advantage of the narrow scope of Title II of 
the ECPA have increased.157 Courts have struggled with this problem, 
sometimes concluding that defendants are not technically liable under Title I 
or Title II, although their conduct seems inherently wrongful. This increased 
 
 
statutes.  
 151. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994); see also supra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 152. This is very important to effect Congress’s intentions in the ECPA; often a court’s 
interpretation of the meaning of the key term “access” determines the outcome of the case. For 
examples of decisions that turn at least in part on the court’s interpretation of “access,” see supra notes 
68 and 120 and accompanying text. 
 153. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994); see also supra  note 82 for the text of the statute. 
 154. Even after this change , it would remain proper to apply all the current exceptions listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(b). It should be noted that the proposed amendment encompasses only stored electronic 
communications obtained unlawfully. Therefore, non-public service providers such as businesses, 
universities, and bulletin board operators would not face unduly harsh legislative restraints under the 
amended § 2702. 
 155. See supra  note 82 for the text of the relevant statute in the ECPA.  
 156. For a description of UOP’s conduct, see supra  notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see also 
State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Fin. Serv., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 157. See supra  note 115 for a description of technological advances since the passage of the 
ECPA. 
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circumvention of the policy against divulgence of private electronic 
communications makes a strong case for amendment by Congress. 
The liability exception for service providers in § 2701(c)(1)158 is overly 
broad and should be restricted. Specifically, this section should be clarified as 
applying only when access by a service provider is authorized for a 
legitimate business purpose. Congress could accomplish this by adding the 
phrase, “when authorized for a legitimate business purpose” to 
§ 2701(c)(1).159 An amendment of this type would prevent 
misunderstandings by courts in opinions such as Bohach v. City of Reno,160 
where the judge concluded that providers can “do as they wish when it 
comes to accessing communications in electronic storage.”161 Although a 
business purpose standard may have shortcomings,162 still it would deter 
blatant disregard for the spirit of the law by service providers, which greatly 
improves the current situation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 is quickly 
becoming outdated. Courts, commentators, and the technology community 
all demand updated legislation.163 By adopting the above-proposed 
amendments to the ECPA, Congress can alleviate the current interpretation 
 
 
 158. See supra  note 49 for the text of the statute. 
 159. See supra note 47 for the text of the st atute. 
 160. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 161. See id at 1236. 
 162. A “legitimate business purpose” standard may invite deference to service providers by courts 
akin to the deference found in the Business Judgment Rule in corporate law. See, e.g., Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In fact, the temptation to defer to service providers is 
potentially even greater in the electronic communications industry than in corporate law because of the 
specialized expertise involved. Courts may be likely to blindly trust the assertions of service providers 
without too much investigation into the technology involved.  
 163. See supra  notes 116-119, 122, 26, and 27 for examples of subtle and direct desires for change 
in the law. A demand for updated legislation in the electronic privacy area can also be attributed to the 
European Union (EU). The EU’s Directive on Data Protection protects personal information about 
individual customers from being exploited by businesses. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31. The directive went into effect on October 25, 1998, three years after it was adopted. 
See id. at art. 32. Article 25 of the directive is of utmost concern to the United States, because it 
prohibits the transfer of personal information from the EU to countries without “an adequate level of 
protection,” which includes the United States by EU standards. See id. at art. 25. This prohibition has 
the potential to devastate electronic commerce between the United States and Europe. A temporary 
solution has been crafted in a bilateral agreement between the EU and United States companies that 
choose to voluntarily adhere to certain Safe Harbor Principles. See International Trade Administration 
Electronic Commerce Task Force, International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (last modified Dec. 8, 
2000) <http://www.export.gov/safeharbor>. However, a permanent solution to the clashing privacy 
philosophies of the United States and the EU is still desperately needed to preserve the global 
economy. 
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controversies in the courts.164 More importantly, however, these amendments 
have the effect of raising electronic privacy to a level commensurate with 
technology.165 Allowing the ECPA to continue in its current state deprives 
electronic communications users of the precious right of privacy in many 
ways.166 In order to preserve age-old privacy rights in the information age, 
the law simply must be changed. 
Julie J. McMurry 
 
 
 164. See supra  note 145 for further details on the effects of the amendments proposed here. 
 165. See supra  note 145 for further details on the effects of the amendments proposed here.  
 166. For one example of the ECPA’s harsh affect on electronic privacy, see supra note 98 and 
accompanying text. 
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